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Abstract 
Oviedo Convention ascribes priority to human dignity. Between the widely accepted 
principles of biomedical ethics human dignity is adopted first. This stance 
differentiates Oviedo Convention from the so called ‘principlism’, a theoretical 
stance that dominates contemporary bioethics. Principlism corresponds to the ‘four 
principles’ or the ‘famous four’ introduced by Beauchamp & Childress in their 
influential book Principles of Biomedical Ethics where they bestow primacy to the 
principle of respect for autonomy. Faden and Beauchamp in A History and Theory of 
Informed Consent accomplish a further elaboration of autonomy’s primacy in 
principlism context. All the above writers adopt a specific individualistic conception 
of autonomy as an ability to choose. The formulation of this conception initiated in 
US courts, that is why it is excessively legalistic, giving weight mostly to legal rights 
and downplaying the so called second generation of human rights, as the right to 
health, and all rights corresponding to imperfect obligations for beneficent actions. 
These features create what we call here ‘autonomy’s paradox’, which is expressed by 
the fact that a large percentage of the population (demented elders, minors, 
shocked, fearful patients, immigrants partially understanding the language of 
disclosure etc.) although entitled to respect for autonomy as an ability to choose in 
biomedical procedures, they actually miss the expression of this autonomy, creating 
a ‘gray zone’. It seems so that prioritizing and imposing individual autonomy -as   
‘principlism’ does- is not a wise choise in biomedical practice. Principles as dignity, 
vulnerability and integrity, the so called European principles, must also be taken into 
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account. Human dignity, conceived as originating from Kantian ethics, incorporates 
autonomy and beneficence, giving a solution to this paradox by accepting ‘soft’ 
medical paternalism. Dignity gives equal and complementary expression both to 
respect for autonomy as self-determination of the competent, and respect for 
incompetent’s autonomy as beneficial medical practice. 
 
Key Words: Oviedo Convention, Principlism, individual autonomy, Kantian autonomy, 
dignity, beneficence, European principles in bioethics.  
 
 
Introduction  
‘Principlism’ in bioethics is expressed by the “four principles” (respect for 
autonomy, beneficence, non maleficence, justice) which are introduced by 
Beauchamp & Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics, the most influential 
bioethics’ book in Anglophone education, and a handbook of bioethics for 
practitioners and researchers all over the world.  Their conception of autonomy as 
the leading principle is what we call here ‘standard conception of autonomy’ which 
has achieved worldwide acceptance. This standard view of individual autonomy in 
bioethical ‘principlism’ is supposed to originate from Emanuel Kant’s autonomy of 
the will ascribing dignity to rational beings, but it is not really Kantian. It is far more 
rooted in Mill’s naturalistic view of human action although its admirers claim Kantian 
credentials1. Kantian ethics, utilitarianism and virtue ethics rooted in Aristotelian 
ethics, with their communitarian and casuistic branches are supposed to be the 
competing moral theories in bioethics. But virtues are not really opposed to 
principlism, and Beauchamp & Childress admit, that although they possess “a moral 
territory distinct from the principles, rules and rights …however… the two domains 
[are rendered by them] entirely consistent and [they tried] not to give priority to one 
over the other”2.  Although primacy of autonomy could classify ‘principlism’ in 
                                                          
1
 O. O’Neill, Autonomy and trust in bioethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p 30. 
2
 T. Beauchamp /J. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, 
p.57. 
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Kantian ethics its specific conception of autonomy renders ‘principlism’ a form of 
utilitarianism in bioethics.  
What is at stake in the ‘standard view’ of individual autonomy, is the implicit 
dominance of patient’s free choise, over medical beneficence which is supposed to 
be ‘contaminated’ by paternalism, despite the fact that all four principles are 
supposed to share equal status. This conception grounded on the naturalistic view of 
autonomy, creates as it will be claimed here, an inconsistency problem in the 
‘standard view’, namely ‘autonomy’s paradox’. According to the Kantian view of 
autonomy that identifies with the predisposition of personality which is the ground 
of dignity the two principles of respect for autonomy and beneficence could coexist 
without conflict3. The formula of humanity renders the limited maxims of 
beneficence and developing talents as imperfect obligations. “Among vulnerable 
beings agency can be secure for all only when agents act to support as well as to 
respect one another's agency”4.  
Utilitarian and Kantian view, as Christine Korsgaard points out, give different 
emphasis to passive and active aspects of our nature “and this emphasis can lead to 
substantive moral disagreement”5. The Kantian emphasizes our agency, and asks 
‘what should I do?’, while the Utilitarian emphasizes the passive side of our nature, 
conceives persons as objects of moral concern, and asks “what should be done for 
them?’. Utilitarian regards agency as a form of experience. Hume identifies the will 
not with our power to initiate action, but with the feeling we experience when we 
exercise that power. So Utilitarian identifies person with the locus of experience6.  
Mill emphasizes that persons 'at the maturity of their faculties' must be left alone, to 
take their own decisions, as their individuality attributes to their happiness and their 
prosperity. Kant conceives persons as both objects of observation defined by natural 
causes and subjected to certain experiences and also agents that understand 
                                                          
3
 A. Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge- New York,1999, p.118. 
4
Onora O’Neill, “Universal Laws and Ends- in- Themselves,” Monist, 1989, 72, p. 355.  
5
 C. Korsgaard, “Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit,” Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, 1989, 18 (2), p. 101. 
6
  Korsgaard, 101-103. 
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themselves as responsible for their lives7. Kantian autonomy does not signify only 
negative liberty as non restriction, but also positive liberty as normative self 
legislation. Autonomy is not a capacity nor a right, but a feature of moral agency that 
is presupposed for all the duties and obligations and rights. Kant’s   autonomy is 
totally different if not incompatible with individual autonomy. “He *Kant+ never 
speaks of an autonomous self or autonomous persons or autonomous individuals, 
but rather of the autonomy of reason, of the autonomy of ethics, of the autonomy of 
principles and of the autonomy of willing”8. 
For empiricism originating ‘principlism’, autonomy is a capacity, so dignity 
turns back to its original Roman and medieval meaning as a ‘privilege of a nobility 
possessing an authority’, in that case the ‘nobility’ of those possessing the 
competence to choose and consent. This ability to choose is so respectful that it 
must be accepted even in the limited form of ‘reasonable’ free choise. Those who 
are unable even for that ‘reasonable’ free choise, i.e. the substantially incompetent 
to choose persons, who may by the way be the majority, are entitled only to 
surrogate decision making, i.e. to others’ ability to choose, a process which is  
doubtful both morally and practically. We can watch the terminology of surrogacy to 
realize the confusion. A guardian is a court-appointed surrogate, and a proxy, is a 
surrogate selected by the patient himself. The two terms,   are often used 
interchangeably. Legal representative or legally authorized representative are also 
acceptable terms.  Occasionally, the terms committee or conservator are also used 
for court appointed surrogates. As Jessica Berg denotes, “when there is so much 
inconsistency over matters as simple as terminology, it is no wonder that there is so 
much uncertainty about a matter as important as who may serve as a surrogate and 
how the surrogate is to be chosen”9.  
For Kantian ethics though, incompetent’s and incapacitated persons’ 
autonomy is not supposed to be represented by someone else’s judgment, because 
they are entitled to equal respect for their dignity. Dignity is humanity in everybody’s 
                                                          
7
 Ibid, 101-119.  
8
  O’Neill, Autonomy and trust in bioethics, op. cit. 83.  
9
  Berg et al., Informed Consent – Legal Theory and Clinical Practice, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2001, p.109. 
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face, no matter competence’s status and without any kind of mediation or 
substitution of autonomy. “To respect others' autonomy requires that we make 
consent possible for them taking account of whatever partial autonomy they may 
have”10. And for those who totally or partially lack choosing ability, the principle of 
medical beneficence according to the professional standards, expressed in a mild 
medical paternalism, must be the rule instead of substituted judgment. “Where 
autonomy is standardly reduced, paternalism must it seems be permissible”11.  
Oviedo Convention’s  adoption of dignity as the leading principle in medical 
practice parallel to dignity’s primacy in Kantian practical ethics, is creating a binding 
multinational instrument resembling  Belmont Report’s  establishing the primacy of  
the principle of respect for persons instead of autonomy, in research ethics12.  
 
The standard conception of autonomy 
Tracing autonomy’s development in Beauchamp  and  Childress’s   Principles 
of Biomedical Ethics we can summarize their view. “We concentrate on autonomous 
choise rather than on general capacities”13. “For an action to qualify as autonomous, 
it needs only a substantial degree of understanding and freedom from constrain”14. 
Demands “in the context of health care need not exceed a person’s information and 
independence in a financial investment …like buying a new house... Thresholds 
marking substantially autonomous decisions can be carefully fixed in light of specific 
objectives such as meaningful decision making… just as  substantially  autonomous 
choise occurs in other areas of life such as buying a car”15. “Obligation to respect 
autonomy does not extend to persons who cannot act in a sufficiently autonomous 
manner because they are immature, incapacitated, ignorant, coerced, or 
exploited”16. For incompetents the solution is surrogate decision making which 
                                                          
10
 O’Neill, “Paternalism and partial autonomy,” Journal of medical Ethics, 1984, 101, p.75. 
11
 Neill, “Paternalism and partial autonomy,” op.cit. 175.  
12
 R. Andorno, “The Oviedo Convention: A European Legal Framework at the Intersection of Human 
Rights and Health Law,” Journal of International Biotechnology Law,  2005, 2 (4), p. 133-143.  
13
 Beauchamp / Childress, op.cit. 100. 
14
 Ibid, 101.  
15
 Ibid, 102.  
16
 Ibid, 105.  
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might follow three options: “substituted judgment, pure autonomy, and the 
patient’s best interest”17. 
This specific interpretation of autonomy as free choise that expresses the 
personal desires and beliefs departs from Kantian autonomy which equates with 
freedom from the natural law. Autonomy, understanding, and competence become 
empirically graduated magnitudes, although no method of measurement is 
proposed. But even we cannot measure them, a threshold is supposed to exist, that 
separates substantial autonomy understanding and competence, from their 
insubstantial forms. Although the definition of this threshold is so important, it is left 
to be determined at such low levels as in financial transactions, and as Beauchamp 
and Childress admit, it “can be carefully fixed in light of specific objectives such as 
meaningful decision making”18, i.e. under uncertainty and relativity. Persons 
estimated to be under the threshold of substantial competence, are entitled only to 
proxy choosing that is proposed in several forms most of them falling totally or 
partially under the substituted judgment principle. This legal principle according to 
Louise Harmon as she exhaustingly analyses it in “Falling Off The Vine: Legal Fictions 
And The Doctrine of Substituted Judgment”, is a legal fiction and substantially a 
‘puppetry of judgment’ that may be even dangerous for the incompetent. “When we 
assume the persona of another, we need to be constantly reminded of that 
assumption. Something hidden, something potentially dangerous or brutal can go on 
beneath the surface of a legal fiction… The judge is in control of the incompetent, 
and with that control comes an obligation-an obligation to protect the incompetent, 
not to let him wither and die, and virtually fall off the vine..”19 
Autonomy is more exhaustively developed in Ruth Faden and Tom L. 
Beauchamp’s  A History and Theory of Informed Consent. There we can find the 
following diagram of substantiality of autonomy that is supposed to guide our 
                                                          
17
 Ibid, 136. 
18
 Ibid, 102.  
19
 L. Harmon, “Falling Off The Vine: Legal Fictions And The Doctrine of Substituted Judgment,” Yale 
Law Journal, 1990, 100, p.70-71.  
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evaluation of others’ autonomy as free choise capacity, substantial understanding 
and substantial competence20.  
 
We cannot avoid the comparison of this graphic with an electric dimmer that 
changes the light’s power in a certain place.  The point you fix the dimmer serves 
your light needs according to your occupation, the hour of the day e.t.c. Their 
bioethical dimmer of autonomy works the same way, as Faden and Beauchamp 
recognize it, serving needs of opposite sides: “Those who give priority in evaluations 
to the medical welfare of patients  under the beneficence model”, put the dimmer 
high so the weakness of the opposite conception becomes evident and the scope of 
actions that need protection by the principle of beneficence enlarges. “Those 
committed to the priority of the principle of respect for autonomy (the autonomy 
model) will likely argue for a more liberal or less stringent set of standards of 
competence”, i.e. put the dimmer low so to enlarge the scope of actions protected 
by a principle of respect for autonomy. “Conflicts based on these competing moral 
commitments are simply one further instance of the clash that can occur between 
the moral principles of autonomy and beneficence.”21  
It seems that the whole view of standard conception of autonomy is based on 
a near-obsession with defending the need for the patient or the subject to choose, 
with low rationality demands, as in economical rational choice theories. Chicago 
                                                          
20
 R.Faden /T.Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed Consent,  Oxford University Press, New 
York-Oxford,1986, p.239.  
21
 Faden / Beauchamp, 291.  
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School’s motto that  the contracting parties are  ‘rational utility maximizers’ echoes 
Adam Smith’s  dictum  that “every individual, it is evident, can, in his local situation, 
judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver can do for him”. This means that 
they try to satisfy their preferences in the best possible way under the given 
circumstances. What matters is their preferences. And economists don’t judge the 
rationality, the morality or the quality of these preferences22. This conception of 
economical rationality thought, is seriously challenged both externally by libertarian 
paternalism23  and internally by behavioral economics with the concept of “bounded 
rationality”   and the assumption of systematic irrationality24.  
‘Standard conception of autonomy’ suggests that substantial autonomy and 
rationality level needed to make a choosing action may be no more than that needed 
to buy a car. The risk thought in the two areas is radically different. What is at stake 
in bioethics’ consent, is not losing or winning money as in economical transactions 
but stakes of core meaning  for anyone, as physical abilities, plans and expectations 
for the future, quality of life, even life itself, values that are connected with the 
substance of anyone’s personality much more than money loss. If we don’t 
apprehend completely the small letters in everyday’s trivial economical contracts, 
which we usually sign in a hurry without even cast a second glance, the risk is low 
and we can always avoid it by having the patience to read the contract (I don’t know 
a person who ever did it). But if you must choose and authorize a therapy (obliged by 
the informed consent ritual), you must really understand it, not just throw dices, 
because the cost can be your life or its quality. In this case you must comprehend 
elaborate medical terms and processes that even practitioners in different medical 
fields sometimes don’t understand. The central question is why to be obliged to 
choose exercising your autonomy if you don’t really understand, i.e. you are 
substantially incompetent to consent, and how is this choise supposed to benefit you 
                                                          
22
 Y. Foka-Kavalieraki, “Consent as a Rational Choise, Institutional and Empirical approaches,” PhD 
diss., National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2015, p.22-23. 
23
 R.Thaler / C.Sunstein, Nudge, Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New 
Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2008).  
24
  Foka-Kavalieraki,  op.cit., p.93-140. 
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and solve your problem, and it does not constitute just an near- obsession ritual  that 
serves mainly as a responsibility waiver for the practitioner or the researcher.  
The idea that we could be 'ideal rational patients' just like ‘rational utility 
maximizers’ cannot stand. The contractual picture of human relations as in 
citizenship and commerce is questionable in medicine. “This suggests that we cannot 
plausibly extend the enlightenment model of legitimating consent to medical 
contexts….opposition to medical paternalism appears to reflect an abstract and 
inaccurate view of human consent which is irrelevant in medical contexts”25.  
 
The grey zones of free choice in health care and autonomy’s paradox  
We can easily map the gray zones in application of the standard conception 
of autonomy in bioethics. The persons that are in the so called ‘maturity of their 
faculties’ according to Adam Smith and capable for free choise may be the minority. 
“Consent cannot be given by children …. by patients who are seriously deranged …. 
by those with learning disabilities … .by patients with dementia… by patients who are 
traumatized or unconscious… often cannot be given in medical emergencies…. most 
of us (even when in the maturity of our faculties), find it hard to express our 
individuality or independence, and even to muster the presence of mind needed for 
giving informed consent, when we are ill.”26  
Another problem may be the unwillingness of patients to accept the need to 
be informed, to understand the information, and to consent. In one study UCLA 
researchers examined the differences in the elderly subjects from different ethnic 
back grounds, finding high rates of unwillingness to be informed about terminal 
prognosis   or use of life supporting technology, varying between ethnic cultures. 
Their conclusion was that ‘belief in the ideal of patient’s autonomy is far from 
universal’27. Cultural diversity plays a great role in acceptance of the value of 
informed autonomous choise.  
In western countries dementia is estimated from 7 to 20 percent of 
population between 75 and 84 and 25 to 47 percent of those above that age.  And 
                                                          
25
 O’ Neill, “Paternalism and partial autonomy,” op.cit., p. 174. 
26
 O’Neill, Autonomy and trust in bioethics, op.cit., p.40. 
27
  Beauchamp /  Childress, op.cit., p.106.  
 Βιο-Νομικά – Bio-Juria 
Τομ. 1, τεύχ. 1 (2019) – Vol. 1, iss. 1 (2019) 
E-ISSN: 2654-119X 
Available online at http://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/bionomika 
 
 
45 
 
the incidence of the disease seems to be comparable in other countries. Alzheimer 
disease, dementia and the gradual loss of abilities while aging, sum a grant 
presentence of population with limited or absent ability to choose rationally. With 
the aging of the Baby Boom generation, these numbers are expected to escalate 
drastically28.  
The so called opacity of medical information further eliminates the value of 
free choise. “Referential opacity and failure to grasp the consequences show that 
informed consent can be quite superficial, fastening on the actual phrases and 
descriptions used, and need not take on board much that is closely connected to, 
even entailed by, those phrases and descriptions”29. Opacity enlarges when there is 
not enough comprehension of the language, as in the case of immigrants or 
undereducated persons. 
The rest of the population that is supposed to be in ‘the maturity of their 
faculties’, must be estimated for the substantiality of their autonomy and so 
understanding and choosing. Faden and Beauchamp’s ‘dimmer’ of substantiality can 
lead us to different competence of free choise judgments. As Faden and Beauchamp 
admit respect for autonomy   and   beneficence principles’ conflict affect the level of 
substantiality of competence so it is in other words relative and arbitrary (Faden and   
Beauchamp 1986, 291). Turning the dimmer right you have plenty of free choosers 
turning it left you create a gray zone of autonomy.  
By summing all those exceptions of free choise ability,   ‘autonomy’s paradox’ 
is created. The paradox consists that in a context where free choise autonomy rules, 
the majority possibly of patients and subjects are left under the threshold of 
substantial competence to choose.  
All these cases of limited or absent competence are supposed to express 
their free choise through substituted judgment or the previous autonomy principle 
expressed by advance directives.  We claim here that advance directives although 
legally and philosophically more justified than proxy consent, can also be interpreted 
as substituted judgment, at least at the part concerning the environmental, 
                                                          
28
 R.Dresser / P. Whitehouse, "The Incompetent Patient on the Slippery Slope,” The Hastings Center 
Report 24, 1994, 4, p.7. 
29
 O’Neill, Autonomy and trust in bioethics, op.cit., p.44. 
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experiential and scientific changes that may have occurred during the time elapsed 
between the writing of the directives and its execution (the possible new interests 
are in that case substituted by older ones). By creating an obvious inconsistency 
issue with incompetent’s present interests, proxies are sometimes called by judges 
to estimate their validity, i.e. to substitute the incompetent’s previous judgment. 
The big question concerning advance directives is if their composer would have the 
same opinion under the pressure of her present interests. As John Robertson says 
“advance directives such as living wills are attractive in that they give us a sense of 
control over our futures. But they also tend to obscure conflicts between a patient's 
competent wishes and later, incompetent interests”30. The President’s Council on 
Bioethics in US concluded that advance directives do not override the patient’s 
present interests31. Oviedo Convention keeping a safe distance from free choise 
obsession, in Article 9 declares that “the previously expressed wishes relating to a 
medical intervention by a patient who is not, at the time of the intervention, in a 
state to express his or her wishes shall be taken into account” avoiding this way to 
recognize the absolute validity of advance directives.  
We claimed that advance directives fall at a great part under substituted 
judgment principle. This principle thought also poses certain questions. Apart from 
characterizing it a legal fiction or a puppetry of judgment32 according to Louise 
Harmon how far can the substitution of another person’s judgment go, how close 
can it be to the original judgment the incompetent would make if not incompetent? 
How strong an impact has the present conditions, the momentum of the decision, 
apart from the history of the person and her expressed opinions? Can we see in the 
eyes of the other or be in her shoes in matters concerning life and death? 
“Consciousness is in principle subjective, phenomenological, irreducible, and 
impossible to understand from the outside”33. But apart from being impossible to 
substitute other’s phenomenology of experience, as it is impossible according to 
                                                          
30
 J.Robertson, “Second Thoughts on Living Wills,” The Hastings Center Report, 1991, 21 (6). 
31
 Beauchamp and Childress, op.cit., 139.  
32
 Harmon, op.cit.  
33
  Dresser /Whitehouse, op.cit.,p. 8. 
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Thomas Nagel to answer “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”34 there are more things at 
stake here. Substituted judgment is a chimerical action with borrowed agent who 
has no responsibility because she is deciding in the name of another. Her judgment’s 
result is not an action, but a theater of agency. It can even be an easy way for proxy 
relatives to get rid of troublesome elders or terminally ill patients. Standard view’s 
obsession with free choise renders this theater of patient’s choise more valid than 
beneficent medical treatment according to incompetent patient’s best interests. As 
Rebecca Dresser and Peter Whitehouse notice “the ethicists' and  policymakers' 
near-obsession with defending the competent person's right to control her future 
treatment, has left the best interests standard inadequately developed and subject 
to widely varied interpretation”. There is a need “to develop a robust and principled 
approach to best interests’ decision-making”35.  
Grisso and Appelbaum in Assessing Competence to Consent to Treatment 
propose   a ‘competence balance scale’ an ‘autonomy cup’ is at the one end of a 
measuring scale, and a ‘protection cup’ at the other36.  This beneficence – autonomy 
‘balance scale’ seems a possible solution to ‘autonomy’s paradox’. Beneficence 
would override free choise autonomy, as the risk or the complexity of choise 
increases. That would drive us closer to the  Kantian concept  of dignity as grounded 
on principled autonomy that incorporates beneficence obligation to others, giving a 
solution to ‘autonomy’s paradox’ by accepting a mild professional paternalism in 
therapy and research, guided by professional, legal, and educational changes that 
could raise trust in biomedical interaction. “Placing autonomy in the context of trust 
allows for an emphasis on the positive as well as the negative side of autonomy 
…negative being the ‘hands off’ non interference ethic ….the positive …. an 
empowerment to relate.”37  
 
Oviedo Convention’s Kantian strategy 
                                                          
34
 T.Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review, 1974, 83, (4). 
35
 Dresser / Whitehouse, op.cit., p. 6.  
36
 Grisso / Appelbaum, Assessing Competence to Consent to Treatment: A Guide for Physicians and 
Other Health Professionals, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, p.139.  
37
 Churchill, “Trust, autonomy, and advance directives,” Journal of Religion and Health, 1989, 28, (3), 
p.181. 
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Many bioethicists doubt that the American model of autonomy in 
principlism’s context is compatible with the European model giving weight to dignity. 
The BIOMED II project “Basic Ethical Principles in European Bioethics and Biolaw” 
(1995–1998) was based on cooperation between 22 partners between EU countries. 
The project identified four dominant ethical principles of respect for autonomy, 
dignity, integrity and vulnerability. These principles are supposed to form ‘European 
Principlism’ conceptually and empirically founded in anthropology of the bodily-
incarnated human being.  “We may say that the principles provide the normative 
foundations for required respect for the human body. Empirically, this argument is 
enforced by a continuing concern for the human body in European biolaw. 
Moreover, the principles evoke the concern of respect for the human body. There is 
an ongoing personalisation of the body.”38 Oviedo Convention falls in the European 
model ascribing primacy to dignity originating from Kantian ethics. According to 
Article 1, the Convention aims to “protect the dignity and identity of all human 
beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity 
and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology 
and medicine.” This   twofold distinction of the dignity’s beneficiaries as “human 
beings” on one hand, and “everyone” on the other, reveals the Convention’s concern 
to include all human beings, either covered by the legal status of person in their 
state or not39. Counting and defining thresholds in moral area easily creates paradox 
states. If we accept gradation we would have to answer questions as how low is the 
low and how far from the very low is zero? The Kantian could not accept such 
calculations as “the one option not open to Kant is to allow gradations of human 
dignity or differences in rank among members of the realm of ends”40.  
Oviedo Convention is a binding instrument that offers a comprehensive 
approach to the whole domain of bioethics, sets a framework of principles to 
prevent practices that would most seriously infringe on human rights and human 
                                                          
38
 J.Rendtorff, “Basic ethical principles in European bioethics and biolaw: Autonomy, dignity, integrity 
and vulnerability – Towards a foundation of bioethics and Biolaw Medicine,” Health Care and 
Philosophy,  2002, 5, p.235–244.   
39
 Andorno, op.cit, p.137.   
40
 Wood, op.cit, 121. 
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dignity, with minimum common standards and implementation at the national level, 
demanding also judicial protection by national courts41. By adopting dignity 
Convention makes a strong point on everybody’s claim for respect, and changes the 
utilitarian way of conceiving autonomy as free choise. Because of its Kantian origin, 
dignity addresses equally to perfect and imperfect duties, and so can be expressed in 
both principles, that of respect for autonomy and that of beneficence. The conflict 
between beneficence model  and autonomy model seems to cease under dignity that 
renders everybody dignified and so deserving equal respect to her free choise to the 
extend she is competent to express it,  and to beneficent protection from there on. 
Questioning beneficence as equal to free choise autonomy in bioethics because of 
the fear of paternalism is at least weird. Biomedicine’s goal is personal and societal 
benefit and respect for autonomy is a presupposition not a telos of biomedical 
interaction. Beneficence expressed as a professional conception of the good, cannot 
be put under a veil of ignorance because of the fear of paternalism, as in citizenship 
and commerce. It is the main professional duty of biomedicine and its telos.  
Incapable or impaired forms of agency need not be surrendered to proxy choosers, 
the fundamental Kantian moral idea is dignity as the humanity in everyone’s person. 
This central idea gives everybody  dignity no matter her mental or bodily abilities, 
and  as dignity is absolute and not comparable with anything else, no human being 
can be faced as lower from or superior to anyone else. The vulnerability of human 
nature renders protection necessary. Kant thinks that we should not make non-
beneficence into a principle. “If vulnerable sorts of agency are to be developed and 
kept intact, the bearers of such fragile capacities for action may also need help in 
achieving certain subjective ends. The sorts of help they may need are 
unpredictable.”42 
Quantitive evaluation of autonomy based on empirical conception of 
personhood as choise competence lets incompetent with no person. All those 
empirical qualifiacations can lead to devaluation of classes of humans. Michael 
Tooley for example in a hard utilitarian way claims that “most people would prefer 
to raise children who do not suffer from gross deformities or from severe physical, 
                                                          
41
  Andorno, op. cit., p.134-5.   
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 O’Neill, op.cit., p. 354. 
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emotional, or intellectual handicaps.. if … there is no moral objection to infanticide 
the happiness of society could be significantly and justifiably increased.”43This 
contempt of human body with diminished or lacking abilities, and consequently 
diminished or lacking personhood, echoes the whistle of lethal gas in Nazi vans that 
made the tour of mental institutions around Europe that led to the extinction of 
thousands of mentally ill children and grownups. Humanity is represented in 
everyone, equally connected with her personhood conceived as agency and her body 
independently of its conditon. Christine   Korsgaard’s Kantian view of personal 
identity denotes that “the human body must be conceived as a unified agent… as 
things stand it is the basic kind of agent”44. Comatose and demented patients’ 
personhood bestows them dignity. Dignity assigns them rights that entail beneficial 
obligations. In that way we agree "positively" with humanity as an end-in-itself.  
 
Conclusion 
The notion of free choice autonomy conceives persons as powers possessors, 
powers that bestow them the dignity of choosing. The notion of human dignity as 
the bedrock of Oviedo Convention, addressed both to ‘human beings’ and  
‘everyone’, sketches humans in a Kantian way, a way far more familiar to common 
morality and common sense. No matter how far the mental or bodily abilities are 
eliminated, dignity remains in the person of the injured, which is the face of 
humanity and assigns  respect both to her autonomous choise to the extend she is 
capable of, and to beneficial protection according to professional bioethical duties 
on her best interests.    
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